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The	 2018	 elections	 surprised	 most	 analysts	 and	 political	
scientists	 in	Brazil	 and	abroad.	The	 competitive	dynamic	 that	opposed	
the	 PT	 and	 the	 PSDB	 in	 presidential	 elections	 since	 1994	 has	 been	
disrupted,	 resulting	 in	 a	 novelty	 for	 the	 Brazilian	 party	 system.	 The	
purpose	of	this	research	article	 is	 to	 identify	the	determinants	of	votes	
for	 Jair	 Bolsonaro	 in	 the	 two	 rounds	 of	 the	 2018	 presidential	 election	




importance	 of	 variables	 linked	 to	 voters'	 political	 identification	 all	
underpinned	the	victory	of	Jair	Bolsonaro.	














he	 2018	 elections	 surprised	most	 analysts	 and	 political	 scientists	 in	
Brazil	 and	abroad.	The	biggest	prize,	 the	Presidency	of	 the	Republic,	
was	won	 by	 a	 Congressional	 Deputy	with	 a	modest	 career	 record:	 retired	 army	
captain	 Jair	 Bolsonaro,	 who	 headed	 a	 coalition	 comprising	 two	 low-profile	
conservative	parties,	the	Social	Liberal	Party	(PSL)	and	the	Brazilian	Labor	Renewal	
Party	(PRTB).		
The	 2018	 election	 may	 represent	 a	 watershed	 for	 the	 Brazilian	 party	
system,	by	having	broken	the	competitive	logic	that	had	set	the	Workers'	





















For	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 research	 article,	 dependent	 variables	 were	







in	 the	 first	 round	 (1588	 cases),	 and	 Jair	 Bolsonaro	 and	 Fernando	Haddad	 in	 the	
second	 round	 (1734	 cases).	 Interviewees	who	did	not	 vote,	who	voted	 for	 other	
candidates,	 who	 casted	 blank	 votes	 or	 annulled	 their	 ballots,	 or	 who	 did	 not	
remember	or	did	not	want	to	answer	the	question	were	excluded.	The	selection	of	
the	 three	 candidates	was	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 accounted	 for	 87.8%	of	 valid	
votes	 and	 only	 a	 low	 number	 of	 respondents	 indicated	 that	 they	 had	 voted	 for	
other	candidates.	A	substantial	number	of	lost	cases	occurred	because	about	20%	
of	respondents	said	they	did	not	vote	or	did	not	answer	the	question.	
The	 explanatory	 variables	were	 aggregated	 into	 two	blocks	 according	 to	
the	literature	on	electoral	behavior	in	Brazil.	The	first	block	consisted	of	variables	
related	 to	 retrospective	 evaluations	 (Evaluation	 of	 the	 Government;	 Economic	
Status;	Personal	Economic	Status;	Being	a	beneficiary	of	the	Bolsa	Família	Program	
(BFP);	 Evaluation	 of	 Politicians).	 The	 second	 block	 of	 variables	 were	 linked	 to	
political	 identification	 (Party	 Identification;	 Negative	 Party	 Identification;	
Ideological	 Self-Placement).	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	 blocks,	 sociodemographic	
variables	and	a	contextual	variable	were	included	in	the	analysis.	





related	 exclusively	 to	 the	 economy.	 Thus,	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 retrospective	 voting	
brings	us	 closer	 to	 the	possibility	 of	 vertical	 accountability,	 that	 is,	 the	 ability	 to	
punish	 or	 reward	 representatives	 according	 to	 the	 evaluation	 of	 their	
performance.	
The	 relationship	 between	 political	 identification	 and	 electoral	 behavior	
has	a	long	history	in	political	science.	Both	authors	linked	to	the	Michigan	School	
(CAMPBELL	 et	 al.,	 1960;	 CONVERSE,	 1964)	 and	 those	 of	 the	 Rational	 Choice	
persuasion	(DOWNS,	1999;	FIORINA,	1981),	 in	spite	of	differing	assumptions,	












The	 analysis	 of	 the	 vote	 in	 the	 first	 round	 was	 made	 by	 multinomial	
logistic	regressions.	As	mentioned,	those	who	voted	for	Ciro	Gomes,	Jair	Bolsonaro	
and	Fernando	Haddad	were	compared,	with	the	last	group	being	members	of	the	
reference	 category.	 For	 the	 second	 round,	 the	 technique	 we	 used	 was	 binomial	
logistic	 regression.	 Thus,	 Bolsonaro	 voters	were	 compared	Haddad	 voters,	 again	
members	 of	 the	 reference	 category.	 For	 both	 rounds,	 three	 different	 tests	 were	
performed	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 selected	 variables.	 The	 first	
involved	retrospective	evaluation	variables,	the	second,	political	identification	
variables	 and	 the	 third	 (the	 general	model)	 included	both	blocks.	 In	 all	 of	 them,	
sociodemographic	and	contextual	variables	were	present.		
The	 results	 show	 that	 the	 six	 models	 were	 statistically	 significant.	
However,	some	important	differences	between	them	should	be	highlighted.	 In	
both	 the	 first	 and	 second	 rounds,	 the	 political	 identification	 models	 presented	
more	 robust	 results	 than	 those	 that	 included	 retrospective	 evaluation,	 including	




Individually,	 regarding	 retrospective	 evaluation,	 we	 found	 consistent	
effects	 on	 three	 variables	 in	 both	 rounds.	 Evaluating	 the	 Temer	 Government	 as	
great/good	 and	 average,	 compared	 to	 those	 who	 evaluated	 it	 as	 bad/terrible,	
increased	 chances	 of	 voting	 for	 Bolsonaro	 rather	 than	 Haddad.	 Evaluating	 the	
country's	 economic	 situation	 as	 equal	 or	 better	 than	 in	 the	 previous	 12	months	
______________________________________________________________________________________________	
2The	model	including	only	the	retrospective	evaluation	variables	had	an	R2	Nagelkerke	of	
.269	(p	<.001)	 in	 the	 first	round	and	of	 .204	(p	<.001)	 in	 the	second	round.	The	model	















The	 variables	 related	 to	 political	 identification	 were	 all	 important	











the	2010	Eseb,	 for	example,	03%	of	 respondents	 said	 they	 liked	 the	Green	Party	
(PV)	 of	 then	 presidential	 candidate	Marina	 Silva.	 In	 subsequent	 years,	 however,	
this	 association	 failed	 to	maintain	 the	 same	 level	 of	 preference.	 In	 regard	 to	 the	
PSL,	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 make	 any	 predictions	 about	 what	 lies	 ahead	 for	 it	 as	
Bolsonaro	 and	many	of	 his	 supporters	 left	 the	party	 in	November	2019	 after	 an	
internal	 dispute.	 However,	 the	 party	 retains	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 public	
resources	with	which	to	compete	in	future	elections.	
Regarding	 the	 PT,	 the	 decrease	 in	 preference	 had	 also	 been	 verified	
between	 2010	 and	 2014	 (RIBEIRO	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 SAMUELS	 and	 ZUCCO,	 2018).	





acute	 economic	 crisis	 certainly	 contributed	 to	 this	 result,	 indicating	 that	 some	
groups	 of	 supporters	 may	 be	 more	 susceptible	 to	 short-term	 stimuli	 and	 may	
therefore	 alter	 their	 preferences,	 as	 Samuels	 and	 Zucco	 argue	 (2018,	 p.	 102).	 In	
short,	in	2018,	the	PT	had	a	significantly	smaller	stock	of	votes	to	count	on	than	in	
the	previous	four	presidential	elections.	
The	 results	 of	 the	 multivariate	 analyses	 show	 that,	 as	 in	 previous	
elections,	 party	 identification	 remains	one	of	the	strongest	predictors	of	votes	in	
Brazil.	Identification	with	the	PT,	in	both	rounds,	increased	the	chance	of	voting	for	
Haddad	 rather	 than	 Bolsonaro	 by	 more	 than	 nine	 times,	 with	 the	 reference	
category	 being	 those	who	did	 not	 prefer	 any	 party.	 Similarly,	 identification	with	





had	 risen	 to	 17	 percentage	 points	 (27%	 to	 10%),	 which	 made	 antipetismo,	
comprising	positive	and	negative	feelings,	the	main	party	identity	in	Brazil.	Just	as	
the	fall	in	identification	with	the	PT	resulted	from	short-term	stimuli,	so,	probably,	




rejected	 the	 PT	 in	 both	 rounds	was	 ten	 times	more	 likely	 to	 vote	 for	 Bolsonaro	
than	a	voter	who	did	not	reject	any	party.	As	Ribeiro,	Carreirão	and	Borba	(2016)	
and	Samuels	and	Zucco	(2018)	have	already	demonstrated,	negative	party	identity	
in	 Brazil,	 as	 in	 other	 democratic	 contexts,	 can	 determine	 voter	 choices.	 The	
differences	in	2018's	antipetismo	lie	in	its	extent	and	in	the	presence	of	an	actor	–	







Table	 01.	Multinomial	 logistic	 regression.	 Vote	 for	 the	 president	 in	 the	 first	 round	 of	
presidential	election	(2018)	
	 Ciro	Gomes	 Jair	Bolsonaro	
Evaluation	of	government	(bad/terrible)	 B	 B(Exp)	 B	 B(Exp)	
Great/Good	 .278	 1.320	 .685	 1.984*	
Average	 .441	 1.554	 1.073	 2.923*	
Economic	situation	(much	worse/somewhat	worse)	 	 	 	 	
Much/somewhat	better	 .675	 1.964*	 .307	 1.359	
Unchanged	 .529	 1.697*	 .392	 1.480	
Personal	economic	situation	(not	improved/worsened)	 	 	 	 	
Gone	down	a	class	 .126	 1.134	 .201	 1.222	
Moved	up	a	class	 .028	 1.028	 -.447	 .640*	
Bolsa	Família	Program	Beneficiary	 	 	 	 	
Beneficiary	 -.749	 .473*	 -.710	 .492*	
Perception	vis-à-vis	politicians	being	Brazil's	main	problem	
(somewhat/strongly	agrees)	
	 	 	 	
Disagrees	somewhat/strongly	 .128	 1.137	 -.346	 .707	
Does	not	agree/disagrees	 -.238	 .788	 -.264	 .768	
Party	identification	(none)	 	 	 	 	
Others	 .578	 1.782	 -.008	 .992	
PT	 -.870	 .419*	 -2.246	 .106*	
PSL	 -.080	 .923	 1.510	 4,528*	
Negative	party	identification	(none)	 	 	 	 	
Others	 .536	 1.709*	 -.580	 .560*	
PT	 1.656	 5.240*	 2.436	 11,432*	
Ideological	self-identification	(right)	 	 	 	 	
Doesn’t	know	 .954	 2.596*	 -.099	 .905	
Left	 .954	 2.596*	 -1.034	 .356*	
Center	 1.279	 3.593*	 -.450	 .638*	
Region	(Southeast)	 	 	 	 	
North	 -.423	 .655	 .106	 1.112	
Northeast	 .027	 1.027	 -.872	 .418*	
South	 -.589	 .555	 -.180	 .835	
Center-West	 -.628	 .534	 -.119	 .888	
Color	(non-white)	 	 	 	 	
White	 .266	 1.305	 .324	 1.383	
Religion	(Catholic)	 	 	 	 	
Others/None	 .111	 1.117	 .089	 1.093	
Pentecostal	 -.172	 .842	 .839	 2.314*	
Sex	 	 	 	 	
Male	 -.097	 .907	 .560	 1.750*	
Education	level	 .242	 1.274*	 .089	 1.093*	
Age	 -.010	 .990	 .001	 1.001	
Source:	ESEB	2018.	
Note:	NB:	N	=	1411;	Pseudo	R2	(Nagelkerke)	=	.547;	Log	pseudolikelihood	=	1825.710.	*	(p<0.05).	




































































Regarding	multivariate	 analysis,	 it	 is	possible	 to	observe	 that	 ideological	
self-placement	was	a	good	predictor	of	the	presidential	vote	in	2018.	Being	on	the	
right	increased	the	chances	of	choosing	Bolsonaro	over	those	on	the	left	and	center	
in	 both	 rounds.	 The	 stronger	 correlation	 with	 ideological	 self-placement	 seen	 in	
2018	 relative	 to	 previous	 elections	 may	 also	 be	 linked	 to	 ideological	 polarization.	
According	to	Zechmeister	(2015),	the	more	polarized	the	political	system	and	the	
greater	the	use	of	ideological	positioning	by	political	elites,	the	greater	the	chances	








relevant	 variable	 in	 understanding	Brazilian	 electoral	 behavior.	Residence	 in	 the	
Northeast	reduced	the	chances	of	voting	for	Bolsonaro	in	both	rounds	relative	to	
voters	 living	 in	 the	Southeast.	 Identifying	 the	reasons	 for	 this	contextual	effect	 is	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article.	 However,	 two	 lines	 of	 interpretation	 may	 be	
suggested.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 reward	 from	 a	 retrospective	
evaluation	 of	 public	 policies	 for	 the	 Northeast	 region	 implemented	 during	 PT	
governments	(AMARAL	and	RIBEIRO,	2015).	The	second,	more	political	in	nature,	
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may	 be	 linked	 to	 alliances	 built	 in	 the	 region	 involving	 elections	 for	 state	
governments	(LIMONGI	and	GUARNIERI,	2015).	
Among	 the	 sociodemographic	 variables,	 as	 in	 the	presidential	 elections	 of	
2006	 and	 2010,	 Haddad	was	more	 likely	 to	 receive	 votes	 from	 among	 the	 least	
educated	voters	 (NICOLAU,	2014;	RENNÓ,	2007).	The	 gender	 variable	has	never	
previously	had	an	 impact	on	presidential	choices	 in	Brazil.	 In	2018,	however,	






The	 variable	 Religion	 also	 presented	 statistically	 significant	 results.	 In	
both	 rounds,	 being	 a	 Pentecostal	 Christian	 rather	 than	 Catholic	 (the	 reference	
category)	 increased	 the	 odds	 of	 voting	 for	 Jair	 Bolsonaro.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 new	
phenomenon	in	Brazilian	presidential	elections.	Bohn	(2007;	2004)	demonstrated	
that	 Anthony	 Garotinho	 (PSB),	 an	 openly	 Pentecostal	 candidate,	 mobilized	 this	
electorate	in	the	2002	dispute.	In	2010	and	2014,	it	was	the	turn	of	Marina	Silva,	
another	 openly	 Pentecostal	 candidate,	 to	 galvanize	 the	 support	 of	 part	 of	 this	
group	around	her	 candidacy	 (AMARAL	 and	RIBEIRO,	 2015;	 BOAS	 and	 SMITH,	
2015;	 NICOLAU,	 2014).	 The	 difference	 is	 that	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 a	 self-declared	
Catholic	 candidate	 was	 able	 to	 count	 on	 the	 support	 of	 Pentecostals,	 who,	
according	to	Eseb	2018,	account	for	31.8%	of	Brazilian	voters.		
In	 spite	 of	 his	 being	 Catholic,	 Bolsonaro	 has	 aligned	 himself	 with	
Pentecostal	political	and	religious	leaders	due	to	their	shared	positioning	vis-à-vis	
'moral'	 issues.	 With	 an	 eye	 on	 the	 upcoming	 election,	 Bolsonaro	 had	 himself	
baptized	 in	 the	 Jordan	 River	 in	 2016	 by	 an	 important	 Pentecostal	 political	 leader,	
Pastor	 Everaldo.	 Finally,	 shortly	 before	 the	 first	 round	 of	 the	 presidential	 election,	
Bolsonaro	 received	 formal	 support	 from	 leaders	of	 several	Pentecostal	 churches,	
including	Edir	Macedo	of	the	Universal	Church	of	the	Kingdom	of	God.	
The	data	 collected	by	Eseb	2018	 show	 the	 strong	growth	of	 antipetismo	
and	ideological	self-placement	on	the	right	among	Brazilian	voters	and	the	strong	
impact	 of	 political	 identification	 variables	 on	 voter	 choice.	 The	 choice	 of	
	Oswaldo	E.	do	Amaral	
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Pentecostals	 by	 a	 Catholic	 candidate	 was	 also	 a	 novelty	 and	 deserves	 better	
exploration	 in	 electoral	 studies.	 The	 2018	 election,	 according	 to	 Eseb	 data,	 was	













In:	 The	 Latin	 American	 voter:	 pursuing	 representation	 and	 accountability	 in	
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